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Research on legal opportunity structures has focused on how existing law, standing rules and 
the costs of litigation shape the likelihood that social movement groups will mobilize the law. 
Yet there has been relatively little research to show why and how legal opportunity structures 
change over time. This paper focuses on a case study of the mobilization of procedural 
environmental rights contained within the Aarhus Convention. It addresses the following 
empirical puzzle: how did rights that were designed to help Eastern Europeans achieve 
environmental democracy eventually contribute to a re-shaping of the structure of legal 
opportunities in Britain? Through a two-step historical process-tracing analysis that relies on 
a social constructivist theoretical approach the research shows that environmental groups 
mobilized Aarhus rights in a number of ways and across different judicial venues which 
resulted in an evolution over time of the meaning of access to justice being “not prohibitively 
expensive”.  This research builds on previous work to show that civil society agents are not 
necessarily passive agents situated within legal opportunity structures but rather strategic 
actors that can develop and shape access to justice through policy entrepreneurialism and 
litigation.  
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In the late 1990s the UK government was involved in negotiating and drafting a new 
international environmental treaty, the United Nations Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. 
Known as “the Aarhus Convention” for the city in which it was signed in 1998 the treaty 
entered into force in 2001. The convention’s signatories sought to extend procedural 
environmental rights – the right to participate in decision making, the right to access 
information and the right to access justice on environmental issues – to citizens and NGOs in 
46 European countries. At the time, the UK government believed that it was largely 
compliant with the letter and the spirit of the international law it was signing. Like their 
Western European counterparts this treaty was largely understood by UK elites as a way to 
help Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) achieve environmental democracy in 
the wake of the collapse of the iron curtain. As such, the changes needed to bring the UK into 
line with the treaty and the costs of domestic compliance in the UK were seen to be minimal.  
However, fifteen years later, after a decade of critical scrutiny by international 
tribunals and domestic courts, the UK was judged to be in systemic breach of the 
convention’s provisions on access to justice. The UK has been the subject of more complaints 
in the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC) than any other country. NGOs 
have launched a series of legal campaigns about the government’s failures on access to 
justice and time and again international and domestic courts have found that the obligation to 
ensure that legal procedures are not prohibitively expensive has not been met. At the core of 
the problem are the ways in which the costs of litigation are structured. The cost rules in the 
English legal system mean that the loser in a legal case has to bear their opponents costs, 
known as the “loser-pays” system. This system makes litigation both expensive and risky; a 
party to a case does not know whether they will be responsible for their opponent’s costs and 
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what those costs will be upfront. The expense and uncertainty of this feature of the legal 
system were seen to be a major breach of the Aarhus Convention.  
How did this happen? The system that structures legal opportunities in Britain has 
been significantly modified over recent years so as to make it easier and more affordable for 
citizens and NGOs to challenge government decision-making in environmental matters. How 
did procedural environmental rights that were designed to help Central and Eastern 
Europeans achieve environmental democracy eventually contribute to a re-shaping of the 
structure of legal opportunities in Britain?  
This article offers a two-step answer to this question by bridging legal opportunity 
structure (LOS) theory with a social constructivist approach which examines what particular 
legal norms mean for different actors over time. First, the paper unpacks the motivations of 
Western European political actors in the development and negotiation phase of the Aarhus 
Convention. The research highlights the important role played by NGOs in the early phases 
of the development of the convention. I also show that the goal of diffusing procedural 
democratic rights in the CEECs, the Caucasus and Central Asia was a priority for Western 
European states. The aim of Western European elites was to support social movement 
organizations in states emerging from authoritarianism. Second, the paper explores how the 
meaning of Aarhus legal norms changed through a series of judicial interpretations of the 
Aarhus requirements offered by domestic and international courts and tribunals, partly on the 
prompting of environmental NGOs. Environmental groups and individual activists have 
harnessed the rights provisions of the Aarhus Convention in extensive litigation efforts in 
England and Scotland. In doing so, they have begun to use these rights – originally destined 
for others in the minds of signatories – to significantly shape the structure of opportunities for 
contesting decisions of the state in environmental policy back home. This article shows that 
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these civil society agents are not simply passive beneficiaries of rights but rather strategic 
actors that can demand, develop and shape access to justice from the bottom-up.  
This case study helps to shed some light on how and why LOSs evolve over time, 
sometimes in unexpected ways. A rapidly growing literature has explored how the rules that 
shape legal opportunities can play an important role in constraining or incentivising civil 
society use of the courts. The existence of relevant legal stock, the rules determining access 
to the courts and the cost of litigation are all factors that shape the extent to which social 
movements are able to mobilize the law in pursuit of their social and political goals 
(Andersen 2006, Hilson 2002, Vanhala 2012, 2017). However, this literature has tended to 
ignore how and why opportunity structures might change over time.  
This paper begins by surveying recent literature on how and why the LOS governing 
legal mobilization activity matters. It highlights some of the weaknesses with existing LOS 
theory and draws on a social constructivist approach to develop a framework for 
understanding institutional change in the case of the LOS. The following section discusses 
the research methods used to address the research questions and discusses the strengths and 
limitations of this case study. The analysis is divided into two sections. The first section 
introduces the Aarhus Convention and focuses on the motivations of different actors in the 
drafting of the convention. The second part of the analysis draws on two illustrative cases of 
legal mobilization activity by environmental NGOs in England and Scotland. It traces the 
changes in the LOS as a result of legal mobilization in both contexts over time. The article 
will conclude by drawing out some insights about the importance of considering international 
dimensions in thinking about LOSs and broader theoretical lessons about how LOSs change 
over time.  
Legal Opportunity Structures: Review of the Literature 
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Recent scholarship on social movements and their interaction with law and courts has 
deployed the notion of legal opportunity structure to account for why some civil society 
groups embrace legal tactics and others eschew them (Andersen 2006; Doherty and Hayes 
2014; Hilson 2002; Vanhala 2012, 2016, 2017). The focus is on the institutional incentives 
and constraints that shape a group’s ability and/or willingness to sue. There are disagreements 
as to what constitutes part of the LOS and what does not (see Vanhala 2012, 2017), but a 
consensus is emerging that at least three factors matter across jurisdictions and across policy-
areas: legal stock, standing rules and rules on costs. First, legal stock consists of the existing 
body of law and constrains the ways in which social movement organizations can articulate 
their claims if they want to be successful in the courtroom (Andersen 2006). Second, scholars 
also agree that the regulations that limit or allow access to courts – the standing rules that 
regulate who can bring cases – are crucial in determining who mobilizes the law and who 
does not (Evans Case and Givens 2010; Wilson and Rodriguez Cordero 2006). Finally, the 
rules on who bears the costs in litigation also matter in shaping the opportunity structure for 
legal action. In the United States. the norm is that each party is responsible for bearing its 
own legal costs. Under the English rule, by contrast, the losing party pays the prevailing 
party’s fees. This means that the risks and potential costs of litigating in the UK are generally 
much greater.    
While this literature has developed a useful theoretical framework that can help to 
account for variations in legal mobilization across jurisdictions and across policy areas it has 
fallen short in three ways. First, this research has largely focused on the national legal 
opportunity structure as the unit of analysis and has tended to ignore the influence of 
international factors that might shape the legal landscape for social movement organizations 
(but see Simmons 2009). In a world where international law increasingly matters and where 
domestic law is being penetrated by international norms our theoretical frameworks should 
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take this into account. Existing research on how supranational law, such as EU provisions, 
offers important guidance here (see e.g. Hilson 2002 and Evans Case and Givens 2010). 
Second, this research has also tended to understand LOSs as a given. The LOS is almost 
always characterized as an “independent variable”: the factor that explains a particular 
outcome be it why a group goes to court in the first place or what explains the ability of a 
group succeeding in their legal mobilization efforts. There has been relatively little research 
on how legal opportunity structures emerge in the first place and how and why they evolve 
over time (but see Evans Case and Givens 2010 and Vanhala 2012). Third, social movement 
research has now moved beyond structure-agent paradigm debates. In order to adequately 
address questions about variation in social movement organization behaviour we need to 
examine both institutional and social contexts as well as the agency exerted by these 
organizations to shape the structures within which they are situated. Research should focus on 
the recursive relationship between structures and agents in order to explain agent behaviour 
but also to address the issue of structural change (Vanhala 2012).   
In order to address the research puzzle I rely on a social constructivist approach. This 
approach is concerned with how actors shape and respond to new ideas or norms – that is, 
shared conceptions of appropriate behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Constructivism 
also accords an important role to non-state actors who are often seen as the shapers and 
carriers of new ideas or norms. A social constructivist approach is useful for addressing the 
research question here for two reasons. First, it allows scholars to understand the often 
implicit, ideational or rhetorical mechanisms of law as a driver of policy or social change. 
Failing to analyze the different assumptions of actors as they affect the formulation, 
enforcement and implementation of new rights makes it harder for scholars to understand the 
potential content and direction of change. A second advantage of a constructivist approach is 
that it recognizes the inter-subjectivity of legal norms. This approach explicitly acknowledges 
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that the meaning of law is not a given: it is understood differently by different actors. The 
timing of interpretation can also contribute to the multi-valent character of law (Towns 2012; 
Schoenfeld 2010). 
Methods 
To study the use of international legal norms by social movement actors to shape the LOS in 
Britain, this article relies on what Beach and Pedersen (2013) refer to as “explaining outcome 
process-tracing.” In this process-tracing approach I craft an explanation of the outcome in 
question — the change in the LOS — by looking at different interpretations of law by 
different actors, in different contexts, over time. I adopt a two-step methodology to construct 
the account. The first step is to identify the motivations of Western European political actors 
and NGOs in the development and negotiation phase of the Aarhus Convention. In order to 
do so I relied on primary and secondary data, such as accounts written by those present 
during the negotiations and analyses of the drafting process. I also conducted, with the help 
of a research assistant, 60 semi-structured interviews with NGO representative and 
government officials across Western Europe as part of a larger project on legal mobilization 
in Western Europe. Many of the interviewees had participated in the efforts to establish the 
Aarhus Convention or have become involved in efforts to ensure compliance with the treaty. 
The second step is a historical analysis of how the Aarhus rights – on costs protection in 
particular – were interpreted in British and international courts and tribunals in cases brought 
by environmental associations and individuals activists. It explores a range of activities by 
groups across different venues which have contributed to incremental shifts in the LOS over 
time. This research draws on case law and interviews with 24 research participants including 
lawyers and campaigners for environmental NGOs.   
The UK serves as an illuminating case for beginning to identify some of the 
conditions under which a LOS might change. The UK legal system – with its thousand year 
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history and its lack of a written constitution – is in many ways an “unlikely case” in terms of 
experiencing significant changes over a short-term period. The UK also offers the 
opportunity to delve into illustrative case studies of legal mobilization of Aarhus rights. The 
UK has three separate legal systems. English law and Northern Ireland law are both based on 
common-law principles and apply in England/Wales and Northern Ireland respectively. Scots 
law applies in Scotland and is a mixed system based on both common-law and civil-law 
principles. There is also a parallel civil society sector in the different jurisdictions. For 
example, among the larger NGOs, Friends of the Earth Scotland is separate from Friends of 
the Earth in London (which covers England, Wales and Northern Ireland) and both WWF and 
RSPB have separate administrations in Scotland.  This research explores legal mobilization 
activity in both England and Scotland offering two within-case illustrations of the evolution 
of the LOS in the UK.      
The Aarhus Convention: Creating Procedural Rights and International Legal 
Opportunities 
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), promotes the 
idea that individuals should have appropriate access to information, opportunities for 
participation in decision-making and effective access to judicial processes. These soft law 
principles were eventually embedded in international environmental law in the Aarhus 
Convention which was adopted on 25 June 1998 as part of the “Environment for Europe” 
process of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The 
“Environment for Europe” process was established in 1991 in part to help countries in 
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia improve their environmental standards after 
the fall of the iron curtain. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the 
Convention as “the most ambitious venture in environmental democracy undertaken under 
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the auspices of the United Nations [whose] adoption was a remarkable step forward in the 
development of international law” (cited in Wates 2005, 2). 
The Aarhus Convention represents a novel type of environmental agreement in its 
procedural rights-based approach and its imposition of obligations on member states and on 
the European Union (EU - also a member) vis-à-vis civil society (Wates 2011). The 
convention also refers to the goal of protecting the right of every person, both present and 
future generations, to live in an environment adequate to health and well-being. Maria Lee 
and Carolyn Abbot note that “the emphasis on public involvement is one of a range of 
responses to a certain disillusionment with the authority of the state (or the EC) to regulate 
for environmental protection” (2003, 80).  
The Aarhus Convention is also unique in its reflection of the distinctive role of citizen 
groups and NGOs. Articles 4 to 9 regulate in a detailed manner the three pillars of the 
convention: (1) access to environmental information and collection and dissemination of 
environmental information; (2) public participation in decisions on specific activities, public 
participation concerning plans, programmes and policies relating to the environment, and 
public participation during the preparation of executive regulations and/or generally 
applicable legally binding normative instruments, and (3) access to justice. The third pillar of 
the Aarhus Convention, of particular focus here, is concerned with access to environmental 
justice. It grants rights to members of the public, including environmental organizations, to 
challenge the legality of decisions by public authorities that are contrary to the provisions of 
environmental legislation. Article 9(4) of the convention requires that procedures for rights of 
access must “provide adequate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as 
appropriate and be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive.”  
In addition to the extensive rights granted to NGOs and individual citizens the Aarhus 
Convention is supported by a compliance body. At the first Meeting of the Parties (MOP) of 
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the convention in 2002 a mechanism to review compliance with the convention was adopted. 
Several features of the Convention Compliance Committee are unique in international 
environmental law when compared to the compliance mechanisms of other multilateral 
environmental agreements (Koester 2007; Mason 2006). The compliance mechanism can be 
triggered in four ways: (1) a party to the convention may make a submission to the committee 
about compliance by another party; (2) a party may make a submission to the Committee 
concerning its own compliance; (3) the secretariat may make a referral to the Committee; and 
finally and most notably (4) communications may be made to the committee by one or more 
members of the public concerning a party’s compliance. Further, the Compliance Committee, 
rather than being composed of representatives of States, consists of nine independent experts 
serving in a personal capacity and there is the possibility for environmental organizations to 
nominate candidates for election to the committee. Two features of the way this tribunal 
operates – the direct recourse to the Compliance Committee and the input into the 
composition of the committee itself – grant NGOs unprecedented leverage vis-à-vis their 
states and the EU. 
Drafting the Aarhus Convention 
Environmental NGOs were involved at all stages of the convention drafting and negotiation 
process in a manner unprecedented in the development of international environmental law. 
Jeremy Wates writes “[i]ndeed, the initial idea of developing a UNECE convention on the 
theme was introduced by environmental NGOs” (Wates 2005, 10). A coalition of 
environmental citizens’ organizations from across Europe, that came to be known as the 
European ECO Forum, established a working group on public participation, led by the 
European Environmental Bureau (EEB). A convention on procedural rights became central to 
their demands and while there was little support from governments, the call for a convention 
was supported by other parties, such as the rapporteur of the Environment Committee of the 
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European Parliament (one of the most powerful committees within that institution) and the 
European Greens.  Wates has argued that it was this support that ultimately “helped to 
persuade some of the more progressive governments, notably Denmark which was due to 
host the next conference, to push for the issue to be on the agenda for the next phase of the 
process” (Wates 2005, 10). 
NGOs were actively involved in the drafting of early versions of the convention. The 
Committee on Environmental Policy for the UNECE in establishing the mandate of the 
working group charged with preparing the draft convention deemed that NGOs should be 
invited to participate “as appropriate”. Thus before negotiations got under way the UNECE 
secretariat convened a small group of “friends of the secretariat”, including those from the 
ECO forum, to assist it in preparing a first draft.  Jeremy Wates elaborates that when the 
negotiations began,  
NGOs participated to an extent hitherto unprecedented in the development of 
any international law….they were invited to intervene on a basis more or less 
equal to that on which government delegations participated,  having 
considerable input to and influence upon the resulting text…The tradition of 
NGO participation continued uninterrupted into the implementation phase 
(Wates 2005, 10). 
Interview and documentary evidence suggests that policy-makers in Western 
European states tended to understand the Aarhus Convention and compliance procedures as a 
mechanism to diffuse environmental democratic rights abroad. For them, the Aarhus 
Convention was a tool to embed procedural justice and empower the green movement in 
countries that were making the transition to democratic systems of governance. Interviewees 
suggested that actors from Western European governments underestimated the effect of the 
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Aarhus principles in their own countries. For example, one NGO participant from France, 
reflecting on the drafting and ratification of Aarhus suggested that  
At that time we got easy support from our governments; they thought it was a 
good way to destroy the iron curtain. It did destroy the curtain but it was also a 
boomerang. It came back. We then had to do it at home. But it was a very slow 
process…these people did not really take the Aarhus Convention seriously 
(European Environmental Bureau Board Member, 5 December 2011).  
The Finnish Environment Minister at the time of the signing of Aarhus also noted that 
“Aarhus is not always meaningful for Finland but it is for the CEE countries and the green 
movement there….We should reach this kind of agreement on a global level” (Former 
Finnish Environment Minister, 12 September 2011). One observer at the Aarhus MOP, 
referring to the UK government’s stance towards Aarhus said “they never took Aarhus 
seriously. I think they thought it didn’t apply to them” (Former NGO In-house Lawyer, April 
11th 2011). This is supported by some documentary evidence from the UK government. In 
their press release on the ratification the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA) asserted that the Government was “satisfied that the necessary European and 
domestic legislation is in place to ensure complete coverage of the obligations under the 
convention throughout the UK” (cited in Macrory and Westaway 2011, 315).  
 There were undoubtedly multiple motivations for developing and ratifying a treaty on 
procedural rights in environmental issues. For NGOs, this was an opportunity to participate in 
an unprecedented way in environmental treaty-making but it also granted them the 
opportunity to enhance access to justice for environmental groups everywhere. For Western 
Europe elites, evidence from interviews and first hand accounts of the negotiations and 
ratifications suggests that many state participants thought that the main provisions of this 
treaty were already in place in their own jurisdictions and hence would mainly have the effect 
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of promoting environmental democracy abroad. The next section of this paper highlights how 
the procedural environmental rights contained within the Aarhus Convention were “brought 
home” in the UK by domestic NGOs.   
Bringing Procedural Rights Home 
The UK ratified the Aarhus Convention in 2005 and, as noted above, at that time 
“…compliance with Aarhus was not considered a significant challenge – the prevailing view 
was that the convention was largely aimed at the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe” 
(Macrory and Westaway 2005, 315). In announcing the ratification in 2005 a Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs spokesperson said 
Over recent years, the EU and the UK have taken steps to improve people’s 
ability to have a say in the quality of their environment. We are also encouraging 
other countries to make progress in this area, in particular in the Eastern 
European, Caucasus and Central Asian Region. UK ratification of the Aarhus 
Convention confirms our commitment to the best principles of environmental 
democracy, both at home and abroad (DEFRA 2005).  
In short, as far as policy-makers were concerned the UK was already living up to its Aarhus 
commitments and the principles of environmental democracy underpinning the convention. 
However, the following discussion illustrates the differing understanding NGOs in the UK 
had regarding the convention’s significance “at home” in Britain and the way in which this 
has been deployed in legal mobilization efforts to re-shape the LOS in the field of 
environmental policy.     
 The following two intra-case studies trace changes in the LOS in two jurisdictions in 
the UK. Both the English law and Scots law systems have well-developed environmental 
laws (partly due to UK membership in the EU) and can be described as having good 
environmental legal stock. The standing of NGOs was established through case law in 
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England through a series of cases in the early 1990s. However, until recently standing for 
environmental associations was much more difficult to establish in Scotland. Both 
jurisdictions have also operated under a loser-pays costs system until about a decade ago 
when this began to slowly change, first in England and then in Scotland.  
The first case study explores the ways in which environmental NGOs and their allies 
have used the Aarhus principles to challenge the cost rules in the English legal system. 
Through a series of cases brought in English courts and heard before international courts and 
tribunals, like the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the ACCC, the 
environmental movement has successfully deployed the Aarhus principles to incrementally 
re-shape the LOS over the last decade. The second case study examines legal mobilization 
efforts in Scotland. Historically, Scottish environmental NGOs have faced an even more 
hostile LOS than their English counterparts because of difficulties gaining standing before 
Scottish courts in addition to problems with the costs rules. Again, environmental NGOs and 
individuals concerned with environmental protection have used judicial interpretations of the 
Aarhus requirements to radically re-shape the rules regulating access to justice. These two 
illustrative cases highlight how the deployment of international legal norms, which UK 
policy-makers believed they complied with at the time of ratification, in legal mobilization 
efforts have transformed the LOS in both the English and Scottish jurisdictions.   
The Cost of Justice: England and Wales 
For most NGOs interested in legal matters the most worrying element of accessing justice are 
the costs and risks associated with participating in legal activity. As one former in-house 
lawyer at Friends of the Earth pointed out, the problem with the English costs structure is a 
double one, of risk and uncertainty: “Not only do claimants risk paying the costs of the other 
side, but they also have no idea at the outset of proceedings whether, if they lose their case, 
they will have to find £5,000, £50,000 or £150,000” (Michaels 2004). In their submission to 
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the ACCC in 2009 a group of environmental NGOs acting in coalition argued: “The effect is 
that even the largest environmental NGOs in the UK are very slow to take legal action against 
the UK Government. It is extremely rare for small environmental NGOs...to take such action 
for precisely the same reason” (CAJE 2009). The “chilling effect” the cost rules have on 
litigation has also been expressly recognised by the UK courts. In 2004 the Court of Appeal 
in R (Burkett) v LB Hammersmith and Fulham noted that: “An unprotected claimant... if 
unsuccessful in a public interest challenge, may have to pay very heavy legal costs to the 
successful defendant, and that this may be a potent factor in deterring litigation directed 
towards protecting the environment from harm.” In sum, despite liberal standing rules and an 
extensive body of environmental law the LOS for legal mobilization was relatively hostile 
until a decade ago. NGOs and local associations could not easily take legal cases without the 
potential for significant costs being awarded against them.  
The introduction of Protective Cost Orders (PCOs) in 2005 by the Court of Appeal in 
the case of R (Corner House Research) v The Secretary of State for Trade & Industry (2005) 
somewhat changed this picture (senior barrister, 27 Nov 2009; solicitor 13 April 2010). In 
this case Corner House Research, a non-profit organization which supports community 
movements for social and environmental justice, was pursuing a legal case alleging 
corruption in the award of major contracts by the Export Credit Agency. The court 
determined that when there is an issue of public interest at stake costs should not limit the 
ability of a claimant to bring a case. A PCO was thus issued which meant that the claimant’s 
costs would be capped in advance in order to limit uncertainty and expense.  
While the advent of PCOs seemed to be a promising avenue for expanding the 
opportunities to take legal action, interviews with environmental lawyers working in NGOs 
suggested other problems with this particular approach. Problems identified include the fact 
that in many instances a PCO decision comes too late in the proceedings to be of value and 
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the assumption that a claimant will refrain from pursuing a case if a PCO is not awarded. This 
meant that for very serious breaches of environmental law a NGO might choose not to pursue 
a PCO in order to ensure the issue will be addressed by the courts (NGO in-house lawyer, 13 
April 2010 and former NGO in-house lawyer, 22 April 2010). Furthermore, a PCO was more 
likely to be awarded if a lawyer was acting pro bono which made it more financially difficult 
for environmental lawyers allied with the environmental movement. Most significantly, the 
ad hoc and discretionary nature of the PCO regime meant, in the eyes of environmental 
NGOs and their allies in the legal profession, that the UK was not living up to its Aarhus 
commitments. 
The response to this perceived failure to adequately address the problem of affordable 
access to justice was a flurry of activity by those working in the legal profession in and with 
the environmental movement. First, this consisted of coalition building activities and 
lobbying for legal reform on the rules on costs. For example, in 2008 a group of NGO 
lawyers, environmental barristers and solicitors and a leading judge in the administrative 
court launched the Sullivan Report, entitled Ensuring Access to Environmental Justice in 
England and Wales. This effort continued over several years and an update to the Sullivan 
Report, published in August 2010, argued that despite a developing jurisprudence on PCOs  
it is obvious that tinkering with the Protective Costs Order regime will not be 
sufficient to address prohibitive costs and secure compliance with Aarhus. A 
radical change in the Civil Procedure Rules is required, one which recognises 
the public interest nature of environmental claims (Working Group on Access 
to Environmental Justice 2010: 4).  
In addition to the launching of the Sullivan Report representatives from the Environmental 
Law Foundation, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, RSPB, WWF-UK and Capacity Global 
established an alliance called the Coalition on Access to Justice for the Environment (CAJE). 
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CAJE has undertaken a number of lobbying activities: they have conducted research on 
NGOs and their use of litigation; they have written submissions to the Civil Procedure Rules 
Committee (CPRC) to urge them to address the problem of costs and they have presented 
evidence to parliamentary committees.  
Second, the response to the perceived failure of the UK government to live up to 
Aarhus included extensive legal mobilization activity. This consisted of a series of legal cases 
launched by different environmental groups in different forums. Since the mid-2000s there 
have been a number of cases concerning the issue of costs in environmental cases which have 
all questioned the working of the cost rules and contributed to incremental shifts in levels of 
access to justice.    
In 2005 members of a local campaign group challenged the decision of the 
Environment Agency to approve the operation of a cement works, including waste 
incineration, in Rugby. They relied, in particular, on the fact that the project had not been the 
subject of an environmental impact assessment. The claimants lost their case in the 
administrative court and also lost in the Court of Appeal in 2008. Costs were awarded against 
the claimants for £88 000. The decision against full costs was appealed and the Supreme 
Court ruled that the costs order should be stayed pending the reference to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling about how to interpret the expression “not prohibitively expensive” in the 
EU directive implementing the Aarhus principles. When Edwards v Environment Agency 
(2014) was finally decided in 2014 after the preliminary ruling of the CJEU the Supreme 
Court concluded that the cost of litigation must not exceed the financial resources of the 
person concerned nor appear to be objectively unreasonable; the court could consider 
“whether the claimant has a reasonable prospect of success, the importance of what is at 
stake . . . , the complexity of the relevant law and procedure, the potentially frivolous nature 
of the claim . . . .” The use of “could” rather than “should” is illuminating and highlights the 
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continued degree of discretion granted to courts in making costs rulings. In short, the final 
decision improved matters somewhat but not in a completely straightforward manner. 
At the same time other environmental groups were pursuing the legal campaign 
against unaffordable justice in supranational venues. In 2005 CAJE submitted a complaint to 
the European Commission alleging UK non-compliance with the Aarhus Convention. In a 
series of infringement proceedings in the CJEU the commission claimed that the UK 
government failed to give effect to the European directives implementing the Aarhus 
Convention. The high cost of legal action to protect the environment was the crux of the 
complaint. The commission sent the UK a letter of formal notice – in which the commission 
sets out how a Member State has failed to comply with the requirements of EU law - in 
December 2007 and issued the UK with a Reasoned Opinion which is a more detailed 
outlining of the issues in March 2010. In April 2011 the European Commission referred the 
UK to the European Court for failing to transpose obligations in Directive 2003/35/EC which 
implement the requirements of Article 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention to provide access to 
justice in environmental cases which is not prohibitively expensive. The case, Case C-530/11 
European Commission v United Kingdom [2014] ECR 0000, was heard in July 2013. The 
Advocate-General’s opinion, released in September 2013, began with the statement “It is well 
known that in the United Kingdom court proceedings are not cheap.” In February 2014, the 
CJEU gave its judgment. It found that the costs regime for environmental judicial review 
cases which had been in place in the UK in 2010 had not properly implemented the “not 
prohibitively expensive” requirement. However, because of shifting regulations back in 
Britain, in part in response to domestic court cases brought by environmental NGOs and in 
anticipation of the results of this case, the judgment of the CJEU was somewhat outdated 
because of revisions in the jurisdictions’ cost regime in 2013.   
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In parallel with this activity by NGOs in the European Union judicial venues, in 2008 
ClientEarth, an NGO of environmental lawyers, made a complaint to the ACCC alleging that 
the law and jurisprudence of the UK failed to comply with the requirements of the 
convention. ClientEarth represented the Marine Conservation Society, a group that was 
unable to mount a legal challenge against allegations of toxic waste dumping near the Port of 
Tyne, Newcastle, because of fears about the potentially crippling costs of losing a potential 
court case. The ClientEarth communication cites in particular restrictions on review of 
substantive issues through judicial review procedures, limitations on the possibility for 
individuals and NGOs to challenge acts or omissions of private persons which contradict 
environmental law, the “chilling effect” of costs rules and the uncertain and overly restrictive 
nature of rules related to time limits within which an action for judicial review can be brought 
in England and Wales. These claims were further supported by an amicus brief by CAJE. In 
2010 the Aarhus Compliance Committee in its findings held that the UK was failing to live 
up to its full obligations under the convention in terms of the prohibitive expense, particularly 
by the absence of any clear legally binding directions from the legislature or the judiciary 
about how to make decisions on costs to this effect.  
In April 2013 the coalition government introduced bespoke reforms to the Civil 
Procedure Rules in cases where the Aarhus Convention would be relevant. The rules stated 
that in any Aarhus-relevant judicial review a claimant could not be ordered to pay costs 
exceeding the certain amounts – £5,000 for individuals and £10,000 for associations and 
NGOs. However, the reform also offered a reciprocal cap on costs of the other side: costs 
recovery against a losing defendant would be capped at £35,000 and it is worth noting that 
there has been a general hostility from the Conservative-led government and the subsequent 
Conservative government to the use of judicial review by civil society actors. These reforms 
meant that by the time the CJEU delivered its findings, which were then adopted into the 
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Edwards v Environmental Agency, the position of the UK had 
already improved.  
However, in September 2015, following the election of a Conservative majority that 
spring, the Ministry of Justice launched a consultation on a series of proposals relating to the 
costs issue. The Government suggested that the proposals “are intended to tackle the potential 
for people to use meritless judicial review applications to cause delay and frustrate proper 
decision-making” (Ministry of Justice 2015). The proposed changes would again make it 
much more expensive for environmental NGOs to bring cases and would enhance uncertainty 
as to overall costs exposure. Most significant among the proposed reforms is the doubling of 
the cost caps to £10 000 for individuals and £20 000 for organizations. The environmental 
movement responded vigorously to these proposals which could have the effect of negating 
their previous decade’s efforts in the courts. This looks increasingly likely with the 
withdrawal of the UK from the European Union following the 2016 Brexit referendum.  
Even after ten years of legal mobilization in a variety of venues the struggle over the 
LOS and the meaning of the Aarhus obligations on access to justice continues in England and 
Wales. This discussion highlights the international dimension of the LOS in this case. First, 
the groups examined here have relied on the Aarhus Convention and EU law implementing 
the Aarhus principles in domestic courts. In doing so these environmental NGOs have been 
able to highlight the constraints within the UK opportunity structure in English courts. 
Second, these organizations have also filed complaints with international institutions such as 
the ACCC and the European Commission. This has triggered compliance mechanisms “from 
above” the state as well. This has resulted in an important shift in the landscape of legal 
opportunities for environmental groups but the battle over the LOS in England and Wales is 
not yet over.   
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Access to Justice in Scotland 
Looking north of the English border provides another illustration that can help to shed light 
on how the Aarhus Convention has had an impact beyond the UK government’s expectations 
on signing and ratification. The Scottish government is obliged to implement the 
convention’s standards: environmental protection is largely a devolved competence although 
the boundary is not always clear in terms of what falls under this heading (Reid 2009; Ross et 
al. 2010). 
In terms of compliance with the Aarhus Convention two significant issues have 
proven particularly problematic in the Scottish context: rules on standing and the costs of 
litigation. First, rules on standing, known as “title and interest” in Scots law have been 
derived from a private law context. A person with “title” is someone who is a party to a legal 
relation, with the focus on ownership, contract, trust or other fiduciary relationship. Second, 
like in England and Wales the cost and risk of litigation is high in Scotland which also 
follows an after-the-event model of deciding costs. Friends of the Earth Scotland, in a 2011 
report on access to justice, Tipping the Scales: Complying with the Aarhus Convention on 
Access to Environmental Justice, argued that:    
…Scotland falls considerably short of meeting its international obligations. 
Aarhus demands broad and affordable access to justice, but the reality in 
Scotland is very different. It can be extremely expensive to undertake legal 
proceedings (environmental or not) in Scotland… In addition, rules on 
standing – and the interpretation of these rules by the courts – are extremely 
restrictive, making it very difficult for individuals, communities and NGOs to 
demonstrate that they have “title and interest” to take an environmental case 
(Church 2011, 6). 
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Among the NGOs examined here this research found that the key Scottish groups 
were involved in efforts to influence the LOS. Although RSPB had previously taken legal 
cases in Scotland it has been largely reluctant to do so since it incurred major costs in a legal 
case with WWF in 1998 (see Vanhala 2012). The Head of Policy for RSPB Scotland said 
“we’ve learned we don’t get access to justice” in speaking of that experience (May 19th 
2011). Similarly, Friends of the Earth Scotland had decided after an anti-roads campaign 
experience that pursuing legal action was too costly and risky (Campaign officer, May 19th 
2011). None of these cases were aimed at influencing the LOS, instead they were cases meant 
to ensure the effective enforcement of EU environmental law.   
These perceived failures of compliance with EU environmental law because groups 
could not challenge government decisions in court due to costs hurdles inspired a series of 
legal cases in recent years in Scotland. Environmental groups in Scotland have been involved 
in these litigation efforts in a number of different ways; from providing funding to individual 
litigants and submitting third-party interventions to using the narratives of failure of access to 
justice to mobilize their constituencies and pressure the Scottish government to reform the 
LOS. The following discussion examines, first, legal mobilization efforts on challenging the 
costs of litigation and then looks at recent involvement by Friends of the Earth that helped to 
change the Scots law rules on standing.   
The concept of public expenses orders (PEOs), the equivalent of PCOs in England 
and Wales, has been developed in Scottish case law and caps the amount of the other sides’ 
costs the petitioner would have to pay if she lost the case. In 2006 Friends of the Earth 
Scotland as part of an anti-roads campaign sought to overturn the Scottish Executive’s 
decision to permit an extension of the M74 through southern Glasgow. The NGO applied for 
a PEO but the court refused to grant one suggesting that the desirability of PEOs being 
introduced in Scotland should be pursued through the Court of Session Rules Council, the 
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body responsible for addressing procedural rules in the court, and not through the law. 
According to the NGO’s access to justice report FoE Scotland “eventually and reluctantly 
withdrew the case to conserve scarce funds and in the face of a potential liability for 
expenses” (Friends of the Earth Scotland 2011: 45). 
Another case, Mary Buchan Forbes v Aberdeenshire Council and Trump 
International Golf Links (2010), that was scuppered by procedural barriers to justice 
concerned Donald Trump’s golf and hotel development in Aberdeenshire. The petitioner 
struggled both with issues of standing and with costs. In 2009, Mary Forbes, a local resident 
sought to halt development at the site. She alleged that the works were environmentally 
damaging and that the respondents did not follow correct Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) and consultation procedures. The petitioner sought an interim interdict (an injunction) 
to stop the works on nearby sand dunes while her judicial review was in the court but was 
denied. In the 2010 decision the judge noted the Aarhus Convention and requirements to 
interpret the test of standing to be in line “with the objective of giving the public concerned 
wide access to justice”. However, the court found that Mrs Forbes, although a neighbour to 
the site, in living a kilometre from the works being carried out, had failed to show that she 
was “affected in some identifiable way” and did not demonstrate sufficient interest. 
Paradoxically, the petitioner had not sought a PEO as they are confined only to public interest 
cases and she had been refused assistance with the costs of her case because her “application 
did not meet the “reasonableness” test for legal aid”. According to the Scottish Legal Aid 
Board legal aid was refused “on the basis of information available to the Board there were 
other people with an interest in the case who it would appear could fund or make a 
contribution to funding an action” (Scottish Legal Aid Board 2011). When Mary Forbes lost 
her initial hearing, and faced the prospect of paying thousands of pounds of the other side’s 
costs, she dropped the proceedings.  
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Another case concerning the proposed development of a new coal plant in Hunterston, 
North Ayrshire, became an important example of how the Scottish government was failing to 
live up to its Aarhus obligations. The proposed site was a Site of Special Scientific Interest 
(SSSI) for its wildlife. An individual, Marco McGinty, brought a judicial review of the 
Scottish Government’s decision to develop the coal plant near his home. Organizations such 
as RSPB Scotland, Planning Democracy, WWF Scotland and Friends of the Earth Scotland 
have all participated in media efforts to raise awareness of the issue of coal-powered energy 
and have used the example of the McGinty vs Scottish Ministers (2010) case to highlight the 
problems with access to justice. Both Friends of the Earth Scotland and the RSPB Scotland 
helped to fund the McGinty case (Policy officer, May 19 2011).  
In some ways the progress of the McGinty case represents a waltz of one step 
forwards and two step backs for Scottish compliance with the Aarhus Convention. A decision 
on costs in an early hearing resulted in the first ever Public Expenses Order (PEO) being 
awarded. In this case the judge, citing the case law on PCOs in England discussed above, 
granted the petitioner a PEO and capped his liability for the defendant’s costs at £30 000. The 
amount was high, particularly in considering the estimated cost of up to £80 000 he would 
face in bringing the case himself after being denied legal aid. Nonetheless the PEO 
constituted an important relaxation of the cost rules. 
However, in another hearing the McGinty petition was also challenged by the 
respondents on grounds of standing (“title and interest”) and timeliness (“mora”). The court 
found in October 2011 that Mr McGinty’s occasional use of the site, five miles from his 
home, for bird-watching might entitle him to “title” but did not meet the criteria of possessing 
sufficient “interest”. The Court clarified this:  
He does not in my opinion have a “real and legitimate” or “real and practical” 
interest to bring proceedings. He does not reside adjacent to the site and is not 
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therefore a neighbour. His use of the site is limited, intermittent and non-
essential. The type of usage he exercises over the site could in fact be 
exercised over any area of land to which the public has access at any location 
in Scotland. He does not sue as a member or representative of a group or 
organisation with title or interest (per Brailsford L.J para. 26).  
The petition was ultimately dismissed on standing and timeliness. In a press release in 
response to the judgment Marco McGinty said:  
I am deeply disappointed in this ruling… This is a sad reflection on Scotland 
and the Scottish planning and legal systems. It would appear that the value of 
the natural environment, as well as the principles of fairness, openness and 
democracy are set to one side when wealthy developers like Peel are involved 
(WWF Scotland 2011).  
In September 2013 the Court of Session upheld the substantive ruling against McGinty’s 
challenge of the Government’s decision to build the coal power plant. The Court also refused 
to reduce the level of costs that the claimant would be liable for despite the fact that the rules 
of procedure that have been introduced since the McGinty case stipulate a standard cap of 
£5000. The Court nonetheless recognised that Mr McGinty had standing to take his case; a 
relaxation of the rules on who could access the courts. In sum, while it ruled against him 
procedurally on costs, the court did rule in his favour procedurally on standing.   
Another case where a PEO was awarded was in an anti-roads case. A campaign 
group, Road Sense, and an individual petitioner who was the Chairman of the group lodged a 
judicial review of the Scottish Government’s decision to construct the Aberdeen Western 
Peripheral Route (AWPR). The new four lane highway would loop around the west and the 
north of the city of Aberdeen. In 2009 Road Sense made a communication to the ACCC 
alleging non-compliance by the UK with its convention obligations in respect of the 
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procedures used in decision-making regarding the proposed road construction. The ACCC 
rejected these complaints. 
  The campaigners continued to pursue the case in the Scottish Courts at that point. In 
2011 Road Sense were granted a PEO that capped the campaigners’ potential liability for the 
other side’s costs at £40 000. In the ruling, which references the Aarhus Convention multiple 
times, the judge nonetheless took a subjective approach in assessing the amount at which the 
cap should be set. The cap was established at exactly the amount Road Sense estimated that 
they could raise from existing funds. In England, in Garner v Elmbridge Borough Council 
(2010), this subjective approach to the granting of PEOs was explicitly rejected by Sullivan 
LJ as being inconsistent with the objectives of Aarhus. The Scottish Government confirmed 
that they would challenge Road Sense’s title to take the case and the campaign group chose to 
drop the action.  
Thus legal mobilization on the costs issue in Scotland had been relatively 
unsuccessful on a number of fronts. The rules on standing fared better. Most notably, 
environmental campaigners have heralded the 2011 UK Supreme Court decision in Axa 
Insurance v Lord Advocate (2011). Friends of the Earth Scotland, participated in the case as a 
third-party intervener despite it not being a case that addressed issues of environmental law. 
This was the first time Friends of the Earth Scotland had participated in the courts in this 
way. The organization also considered intervening in the Road Sense case before an out-of-
court settlement was reached (Campaign officer, 3rd May 2012). Friends of the Earth 
Scotland’s interest in the Axa case concerned the procedural rules on title and interest which 
were also at issue. In their written brief Friends of the Earth Scotland argued that they were 
intervening on the issue of standing for NGOs to bring judicial reviews in Scotland in public 
interest cases. They wrote: 
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FoES is a body with a genuine concern for the environment, who with its 
particular experience in environmental matters, its access to experts in the 
relevant realms of science and technology and environmental policy is in a 
position to mount carefully selected, focused, relevant and well-argued legal 
challenges…FoES do not wish to take legal action on a frequent or regular 
basis. However, it considers that there are a number of environmental issues in 
Scotland that are unlikely to be litigated by any other organisation or person 
(Friends of the Earth Scotland 2011).  
The Supreme Court dismissed the insurance companies’ appeal. In regards to the issue of 
standing in Scottish public law the decision represents a decisive shift. The two Scottish 
judges on the UK Supreme Court in their judgment clearly elucidated a rejection of the 
approach derived from private law in terms of title and interest. Lord Hope held that:  
As for the substantive law, I think that the time has come to recognise that the 
private law rule that title and interest has to be shown has no place in 
applications to the court’s supervisory jurisdiction that lie in the field of public 
law. The word “standing” provides a more appropriate indication of the 
approach that should be adopted (Hope L.J. para 62). 
Lord Reed re-iterated the point:  
In my opinion, the time has come when it should be recognised by the courts 
that Lord Dunedin’s dictum [on title and interest] pre-dates the modern 
development of public law, that it is rooted in private law concepts which are 
not relevant in the context of applications to the supervisory jurisdiction, and 
that its continuing influence in that context has a damaging effect on the 
development of public law in Scotland. This unsatisfactory situation should 
not be allowed to persist (Reed L.J. para 171). 
28 
 
Many of the points made in the judgment echo Friends of the Earth Scotland’s intervention; 
the court concurred with the NGO’s suggestion that the time was ripe “to free Scots public 
law from its private law shackles, and to recognise ‘sufficient interest’ as the proper test for 
standing in judicial review” (FoES 2011).  
 The Scottish Government launched a consultation on a large-scale reform to the Civil 
Courts system in 2013 and ultimately passed the Court Reform Act in 2014. Friends of the 
Earth Scotland and RSPB Scotland raised the issue of standing and costs in their lobby efforts 
when the Bill was passing through the Scottish parliament. Friends of the Earth Scotland 
(2013) questioned whether the proposals on judicial review went far enough to ensure 
compliance with the access to justice requirements of the Aarhus Convention. They pointed 
to the need for substantive review of the merits (as opposed to the mainly procedural review 
offered by judicial review) as well as the cost of environmental litigation. 
The landscape for environmental justice is thus changing rapidly in Scotland with 
some divergences in approaches among the judiciary.1 Starting from an inherently more 
conservative position on standing and costs than the one NGOs were facing in England and 
Wales the position now is broadly similar. The Aarhus Convention has had a significant 
impact on whether groups and individuals are able to access justice in Scotland. NGOs have 
been very active in raising awareness of the implications of the Aarhus Convention in the 
courts and in their lobbying activities with the Scottish ministers and the Holyrood 
Parliament. In doing so, they have begun to significantly shape the structure of opportunities 
for local groups and individual citizens to contest environmental policy decision-making. 
There are now even discussions about establishing a specialist Environmental Court in 




The two-stage process-tracing analysis presented here helpfully highlights how an unintended 
outcome - the opening of the legal opportunity structure in both England and Scotland - came 
about. This research has traced the iterative process by which NGOs can influence the 
establishment of rights at the international level, then use these rights to expand access to the 
courts at the domestic level, then travel back to the international level to enforce this opening 
of the LOS when met with resistance. The social constructivist approach offers a theoretical 
framework for understanding the gap between meaning-making at the moment of 
commitment (the development and signing of the Aarhus Convention) and at the moment of 
compliance (the enforcement of the convention in domestic and supranational courts and in 
international tribunals) (Simmons 2009). In examining the longue durée one can begin to 
account for how the LOS was acted upon in this case to lead to changes that have been 
favourable for environmental groups interested in accessing justice.    
While Western European elites may have had multiple motivations for supporting the 
Aarhus Convention, the goal of promoting democratic processes and empowering the 
environmental movement in the CEECs was certainly among them. I have also suggested that 
policy-makers were taken by surprise by the impact the convention’s rights have had on their 
own legal system. This resulted, in part, because of different meanings attributed to certain 
rights within the Aarhus Convention by different actors. The illustrative cases presented here 
show how the costs and risks associated with litigation across the UK and the restrictive rules 
of standing in Scotland have regularly hampered the efforts of green NGOs as well as local 
groups and individual activists in challenging government decisions. In response, 
environmental NGOs have sought to redefine the idea of access to justice not being 
“prohibitively expensive” in domestic courts and before the ACCC and the CJEU. In both 
examples these processes of meaning-making by NGOs and courts contributed to a 
transformation of the structure of legal opportunities. 
30 
 
 This research contributes to the literature on law and social movements in general and 
research on LOSs specifically. Much research in this vein has tended to treat the LOS as an 
independent variable: that is, it focuses on how the LOS shapes the decisions social 
movement actors make in terms of using litigation as a tactic. This research highlights the 
merit in treating the LOS as a dependent variable as well: a factor that varies and can change 
over time. Taking these two understandings of the LOS together helps further develop our 
understanding of legal mobilization as a process that can have reciprocal effects between the 
activities of social movement agents and the institutional structures within which they are 
situated.    
Future research could engage with these issues in a number of different ways that 
would be fruitful for the literature on law and social movements. An important first step 
concerns the further development of a theoretical approach to explain the conditions under 
which legal opportunity structures are likely to change (researchers could also distinguish 
between changes in terms of a LOS becoming either more open or more restrictive). The case 
presented here suggests a number of factors that may be important in explaining change that 
could be further explored in future research. This includes a) the existence of international 
procedural rights that can contribute to the opening of the LOS both substantively but also in 
the range of different groups have been able to access to demand changes; b) the presence of 
social movement actors that are able to play an entrepreneurial role in shaping access to 
justice through influencing the adoption of new procedural rights and helping to define the 
meaning of particular access to justice rights through campaigning and litigation activity and 
c) the willingness of courts and tribunals at different levels to play a role in expanding (or 
restricting) access to justice. However, only further comparative, cross-jurisdictional and 
cross-policy area research can determine the extent to which these, and other factors such as 




1 In a recent Scottish case, John Muir Trust for judicial review of a decision of the Scottish 
Ministers, an environmental NGO was refused a protective expenses order because the court 
was not satisfied that  the case would be “prohibitively expensive” for the Trust.        
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